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DEVELQFMEUT BY INVITATION? 
SOOTH AFRICAN CORPORATE INVESTMENT IN LESOTHO 
Although Lesotho has come a long way since independence the prospects 
for i t s development look no more promising now than they did in 1966. 
Whi l e s i g n i f i c a n t advances have been made in many areas Lesotho ' s 
basic problems remain, and i t s chronic dependence upon migrant labour 
remittances and Customs Union revenue (equivalent to 40 percent and 11 
percent o f GDP in 1981) has cont inued. In shor t , d e s p i t e the 
escalat ion in aid commitments to Lesotho since the ear ly 1970's1 very 
l i t t l e has happened to a l t e r the f a c t that Lesotho cannot p rope r l y 
o 
support the bulk o f i t s peop le . Moreover , the r a t e at which j ob 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s have been c r ea t ed in the domest ic economy has f a i l e d 
even to keep pace w i th the increase in demand from those s e c t o r s o f 
the population that do not have access to the migrant labour system. 
S i n c e the l a t e 1970 's t h i s emp loyment p r ob l em has worsened 
d r a m a t i c a l l y . Seve ra l reasons may be advanced f o r t h i s . The g l o b a l 
recession, f o r instance, has reduced demand for Lesotho's few exports, 
w h i l e the pro longed drought has s e r i o u s l y damaged the a g r i c u l t u r a l 
economy. In addit ion, the f low of fore ign investment to Lesotho has 
slackened and s e v e ra l o f i t s f l e d g l i n g i ndus t r i e s have d e c l i n ed . 
Moreover , the c l o s u r e in 1982 of De Beer ' s diamond mine in Le t s ' eng -
l a - t e r a i ( sa l e s from which accounted f o r over 50 percent o f the 
country's export earnings excluding migrant labour) threw nearly 900 
1 
Basotho - almost 10 percent of the indust r ia l labour f o r c e - out of 
work^. S i m i l a r l y , Lesotho's t our i s t industry - a l so an important 
export earner - has been hard h i t by compet i t ion from bantustan 
cas inos and by the de t e r i o r a t i on of p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s between 
Lesotho and South A f r i c a 5 . But wh i l s t these f a c t o r s have had a 
s i g n i f i c a n t impact upon the economy, Lesotho has c l e a r l y been most 
a f fected by changes within the migrant labour system. 
Between 1965 and 1977, the number of Basotho migrants to the South 
African mines increased on average 6 percent every year ® but this has 
since fa l len from a peak of 146 000 in 1977 to about 122 000 in 19827, 
and the l i k e l i e s t scenario is that numbers w i l l continue to dwindle 
f a i r l y rapidly. There are two main reasons for this. Most important is 
the pol icy of ' internal izat ion' that the Chamber of Mines adopted in 
Q 
the mid 1970's to reduce i t s dependence on foreign labour . Thus, the 
percentage of foreigners employed by the Chamber of Mines has fa l len 
from 79,5 percent in 1973 to 45 percent in 1978® and 40 percent in 
198210. A s im i l a r p o l i c y has been pursued by mineowners outs ide the 
Chamber. Hence, the proportion of Basotho migrants recruited by non-
Chamber mines f e l l from 32,7 percent in 1976 to 15,7 percent in 
198111. 
The other factor is 's tabi l isat ion ' whereby the mines are attempting 
to professionalise the workforce to g ive a better return on training 
expenditures and to f a c i l i t a t e mechanisation. Accordingly, inducements 
are g iven to migrants to return to the mines on a f a i r l y continuous 
bas is thereby reducing opportuni t ies f o r young men to enter the 
system. Tte impact of this pol icy i s evident from the fact that only 5 
2 
percent of TEBA's (The Employment Bureau of Afr ica) Basotho recruits 
for the Chamber of Mines were novices in 198112, this f igure dropping 
to 3 percent in 19821-3 and 1 percent in 198314. Similar ly, the average 
length of contract increased from 11 months in 1977 to 17 months in 
1981-1-5. Simultaneously, the South African state has had considerable 
success with i t s e f f o r t s to close o f f opportunities for the employment 
of foreigners outside the mines. Hence, the number of non-mine Basotho 
migrants has fa l l en from about 38 000 in 1973 to 21 000 in 198116. In 
addition, a determined dr ive has been made to eliminate the employment 
o f ' i l l e g a l s ' . As a r e su l t , l e g a l oppor tun i t i e s to f ind jobs outs ide 
the mines are v i r tua l l y "non-existent except for those with sk i l l s in 
high demand and scarce supply wi th in the Republic"-*-7. In essence, 
then, the migrant labour system in Lesotho has become almost ent i re ly 
dependent upon the Chamber of Mines and, as a r e s u l t , much more 
v u l n e r a b l e to ' i n t e r n a l i s a t i o n ' , ' s t a b i l i s a t i o n ' and other 
developments within the mining irdustry such as a move towards further 
mechanisation. 
Thus, wh i l s t i t i s poss ib l e that the number of TEBA migrants from 
Lesotho w i l l s tab i l i se at around 100 000 at least in the short-term^®, 
i t i s perhaps most l ike l y that i t w i l l continue to f a l l at between 3 
to 5 percent per annum'-® putting further pressure on Lesotho's paltry 
resources. So, although the ro le that labour migration has played in 
the gradual underdevelopment of Lesotho's agricultural base is widely 
acknowledged2®, the signs of i t s eventual collapse are being viewed 
with increasing alarm by the Lesotho government2-*- notwithstanding i t s 
pe r i od i c statements to the cont rary 2 2 . For, unless a l t e r n a t i v e jobs 
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can be found within the domestic economy, Lesotho faces the prospect 
of a "decline in real incomes for the mass of the population, a sharp 
r i s e in rural poverty , and a substant ia l reduction in Government 
revenues resulting from a f a l l in imports (and a proportional negative 
trend in Customs Union r e c e i p t s ) " 2 3 . Indeed, between 1977/78 and 
1979/80, the proportion of Customs Union revenue generated by migrants 
and their fami l ies f e l l from 50,9 percent to 40,4 percent24. 
Lesotho's deepening employment c r i s i s can be gauged from Figure 1 
which i s based on assumptions about the development of various 
economic a c t i v i t i e s including migrat ion. The number of people of 
'working age' i s set at 600 000 in 198025 and is expected to grow at 
roughly 20 000 per annum26. Full-t ime workers in the agricultural arri 
modern sectors are f i x ed at 150 00027 and 45 00028 in 1980 wi th 
29 
' o p t i m i s t i c ' l inear growth rates of 3 percent and 5 percent 
respectively. On the other hand, the number of migrants (al l mines) is 
p ro j ec ted to dec l ine at a l inear ra t e of 3,5 percent per annum from 
115 000 in 19803". On the basis of these projections, then, the number 
of ' r e s idua l ' Basotho ( in formal sec to r , dependents, and unemployed) 
w i l l r i s e from 290 000 in 1980 to 546 000 in 2000 at a l inear ra te of 
increase of 3,21 percent per annum3'''. As Gray, Robertson and Walton 
put i t "The above p i c ture has d ras t i c imp l i ca t i ons . For decades the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of migrant jobs has provided the o u t l e t f o r Lesotho's 
growing male populat ion, i f at the expense of domestic economic 
development. The second hal f of the sevent i es marks a watershed -
migrant employment is stagnant or fa l l ing while growth of the labour 
f o r c e continues apace The prospect fo r the 1980's i s of an 
4 
Mine Modern % of 
Workforce Migrants Agriculture Sector 'Residual' Workforce 
unemployment and p o v e r t y prob lem of q u i t e unprecedented 
32 proportions." 
FIGURE 1: The Bnploymait Cr is is in Lesotho : Projections 1980 - 2000 
1 
1980 600 000 115 000 150 000 
1985 676 500 96 905 173 891 
1990 768 700 81 093 201 586 
1995 868 800 .67 861 233 694 
2000 992 700 56 '788 270 916 
45 000 290 000 48, 3 
57 433 348 271 51, ,5 
73 301 412 720 53, ,7 
93 553 473 692 54, ,5 
119 401 545 595 55, ,0 
5 
The cha l l enge fo r the Lesotho government i s to dev i se employment 
c rea t i on p o l i c i e s that w i l l make most e f f e c t i v e use o f i t s l i m i t e d 
resources. Rural development is perhaps the most obvious strategy but 
the government's commitment to ag r i cu l tu ra l expansion was c l e a r l y 
shaken by the f a i l u r e in the mid 1970's of i t s i n i t i a t i v e s in th i s 
direct ion3 3 . As a result, although many commentators insist that means 
can be found to overcome Lesotho's f r a g i l e eco logy and maximise i t s 
l imited agricultural potent ia l 3 4 , rural development pol icy in Lesotho 
is now a confused mish-mash of inadequately-funded 'top-down' and 
'bottom-up' p r o j e c t s whi le the emphasis now seems to be upon the 
development of modern sector infrastructure and economic act iv i t i es 3^. 
A principal component of this strategy is the attraction of foreign, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y South A f r i can , manufacturing and commercial cap i t a l 
through the provision of incentives such as tax holidays and certain 
trade advantages. As the Lesotho National Development Corporation 
(LMDC) pointed out in 1982: "At present Lesotho cannot provide enough 
employment oppor tuni t i es f o r a l l i t s people. The government decided 
some time ago that the best method of so lv ing th is problem was to 
encourage the development of p r i va t e en te rpr i se both l oca l and 
foreign. Local enterprise w i l l not, at this stage of development, be 
s u f f i c i e n t to prov ide the required number of jobs. Hence strong 
r e l i ance i s being placed on f o re i gn investment"3®. Surpr i s ing ly , 
though, ttJDC's e f f o r t s to develop Lesotho's t iny manufacturing sector 
(which accounted for only 3,3 percent of GDP in 1979/80) have received 
comparat ive ly l i t t l e a t t ent ion in the l i t e r a t u r e to date. Whi lst 
concern has been d i r ec t ed towards the way in which th is programme 
contradicts the government's alleged commitment to reducing dependence 
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on South A f r i c a 3 7 , there has been no de ta i l ed analys is of i t s 
progress, problems and prospects , in genera l , or why i t might be 
considered " inappropr iate i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n on adverse terms"3® in 
par t i cu la r . This paper, however, addresses i t s e l f s p e c i f i c a l l y to 
these issues using the r e su l t s of o r i g i n a l survey data where 
appropriate. The fol lowing section provides a description of the LNDC 
programme and i t s progress in the 1980's. The focus then s h i f t s 
towards an analysis of (a) the many problems that I^ JDC has encountered 
in a t t r ac t ing industry to Lesotho, and (b) the very l i m i t e d impact 
that foreign corporate investment is having on the domestic economy. 
Some conclusions about the prospects of LMDC pol icy are summarised in 
the f inal section. 
LNDC'S INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
The Regional Context 
Soon af ter independence, Lesotho embarked on an industrial development 
programme premised upon the i n f u s i o n o f f o r e i g n c a p i t a l . 
Accordingly, a campaign was launched to encourage multinationals to 
invest in Lesotho. I n i t i a l l y , however, the pol icy proved conspiciously 
unsuccessful. A var iety of economic reasons may be advanced for this, 
but equally s igni f icant was the opposition of powerful South African 
in t e r e s t s . Lesotho's forays into the industrial arena, insigni f icant 
and unsuccessful though they were, marked a profound sh i f t in pol icy 
towards South A f r i c a . Prev ious ly , a t a c i t agreement had ex is ted 
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between the two countries whereby Lesotho had promised rot to develop 
compet i tors to es tab l i shed South A f r i can concerns. But, g iven i t s 
r e l a t i v e l y cheap and abundant labour, Lesotho (and Botswana and 
Swaziland) appeared ideal ly placed to capture multinational investment 
and f l ood the Republic with cheap imports. In short , then, the 
poss ib l e t ransformat ion of Lesotho from labour reserve to export 
platform was a scenario to be resisted by Pretoria and South African 
1 Q 
cap i t a l . Thus, " the South A f r i can government has responded on 
various occasions to t r y to subvert, by any means, i nc ip i en t 
industrial ventures in surrounding nations which might threaten the 
health of existing vested interests in the Republic."40 For instance, 
an attempt to set up a Honda motor assembly p lant in Lesotho was 
dropped in 1971 f o l l o w i n g pressure from P r e t o r i a . S i m i l a r l y , 
oppos i t ion from Pre to r i a obviated ea r l y proposals to es tab l i sh 
t e l e v i s i o n assembly concerns in both Swaziland and Lesotho in the 
early 1970's.4 1 
Latter ly , however, the South African state has become more tolerant of 
the e f f o r t s of i ts SACU (Southern African Customs Union) partners to 
i n i t i a t e industr ia l expansion programmes. This was r e f l e c t e d most 
obv ious ly in the new SACU formula negot iated in 1969 which granted 
several concessions to BIS, notably their right to protect their own 
in fant industr ies f o r l i m i t e d p e r i o d s a g a i n s t South A f r i c a n 
competition.42 But whilst Pretoria's new approach may be understood in 
terms of i t s attempts to leg i t imise and lay a material foundation for 
i t s CONSAS (Conste l la t ion of Southern A f r i can States ) s t ra t egy , and 
thereby replace a situation of po l i t i ca l confrontation with economic 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n 4 3 , i t a l so impl ies r ecogn i t i on of the f a c t that BLS 
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cannot as yet compete successfully fo r multinational investment with 
e i the r the Republic or i t s bantustans. Thus, BLS tend to prov ide 
investment o u t l e t s f o r South A f r i can companies rather than v i a b l e 
alternative s i tes for multinationals seeking entry into the Southern 
African market.44 Meanwhile, Pretoria has continued to exert pressure 
on multinationals to confine their operations to the Republic and to 
encourage both local and foreign investors to consider the advantages 
of i t s decentralisation incentives over those o f fered within BLS. 
LNDC Pol icy 
LNDC was created in 1967 in order to " i n i t i a t e , promote and f a c i l i t a t e 
the development of manufacturing, processing and mining industries and 
commerce in a manner ca lcu la ted to ra i se the l e v e l of income and 
employment in Lesotho" . 4 5 In the period immediately f o l l ow ing i t s 
establ ishment, LNDC undertook the i n i t i a l roles of entrepreneur and 
investor. Original ly i t was LNDC's intention to invest i t s own capital 
in p r i va t e en t e rp r i s es commencing business in Lesotho, thereby 
retaining a measure of control at management level . However, LNDC no 
longer seeks "equi ty p a r t i c i p a t i o n in new ventures unless i t i s 
abso lute ly necessary" . 4 6 This i s in r ecogn i t i on of the s ca r c i t y o f 
f inancial and trained manpower resources avai lable to the Corporation 
(and LNDC's i n a b i l i t y to absorb heavy l osses in r i sky ventures) and 
the tendency f o r f o r e i gn investors to p re f e r re ta in ing equity 
investment wi th in the i r own shareholding structures . LNDC w i l l now 
invest equity only in certain circumstances, usually upon invitat ion 
( e x c e p t in the case o f ' s t r a t e g i c ' i n d u s t r i e s ) , and no rma l l y 
9 
contr ibut ing no more than 25 percent of the t o t a l . Moreover, LNDC 
periodical ly se l l s o f f i t s holdings in established companies to make 
funds a v a i l a b l e fo r new investors . In 1981, f o r instance, seven 
companies were sold o f f to p r i va t e i n t e r e s t s . 4 7 Thus, the genera l 
l e v e l of l o ca l equity pa r t i c i pa t i on amongst LflDC-assisted companies 
has tended to dec l ine as more and more companies pass through the 
system. In 1981, f o r example, LNDC held over 50 percent of equi ty 
c ap i t a l in 52 percent of ass is ted companies and 0 percent of only 8 
percent48, whereas in 1984 comparable f igures were 32 percent and 39 
percent.4 9 
The declining importance of UJDC as an investor is also ref lected in 
the 1978 decision to re-organise the Basotho Enterpr ise Development 
Corporation (BEDCO) - launched as a subsidiary of LNDC in 1975 to 
s t i m u l a t e l o c a l bus inesses - as an autonomous p a r a s t a t a l . 
Simultaneously, th i s dec is ion l e f t LNDC f r ep t-o devote i t s f u l l 
energies to the task of attracting foreign investment to Lesotho. In 
this respect, LNDC has increasingly come to focus i t s attention upon 
South A f r i c a s ince - as i t s former Managing Di rec tor Sam Montsi 
e x p l a i n e d : " i t i s on our doorstep . . . .and has many aggress i ve 
entrepreneurs who are eager to tackle the world markets. Many overseas 
companies are already operat ing in th is market. I t makes sense to 
approach the parent companies through the i r subs id ia r i es in the 
reg ion. The economic and f i nanc i a l arrangements e x i s t i ng between 
Lesotho and South A f r i c a make i t worthwhile f o r South A f r i can 
companies to set up operat ions in Lesotho. LNDC has been very 
success ful in th is market - most companies which have responded 
pos i t ive ly to our ca l l have come from this area."-'0 
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There are three basic components to UJDC's promotion programme; the 
provision of a 'project service' to approved businesses, the extension 
of concessions v i s - a - v i s f i nanc i a l t r ans f e r s and t ransact ions , and 
advantages in terms of a c c e s s i b i l i t y to markets outs ide Lesotho. 
Included in UJDC's incentives package - under the Pioneer Industries 
Encouragement Act of 1967 and subsequent amendments to i t - are inter 
a l i a : a tax hol iday up to s ix years (or tax a l lowances ) , t ra in ing 
grants up to 75 percent for approved programmes, loans (up to 15 years 
at 12-13 percent annual interest) ; loan guarantees (from international 
'Line of Cred i t ' sources such as the World Bank); custom-bui l t 
factor ies for rent at three industrial s i tes (Maseru, Maputsoe and Ha 
Thetsane); equity participation i f required; industrial estate layout 
and maintenance; administrative assistance as regards permits, plans, 
labour recruitment and d isputes , and p r o j e c t appra isa l ; and, the 
assignment of a supervisory p r o j e c t o f f i c e r . In p lace of the tax 
holiday, investors may apply for other allowances, namely; 145 percent 
( f i r s t year ) , 75 percent ( in f i r s t year; 50 percent over next 20 
years) and 4 5 percent grants ( in f i r s t year; 80 percent over next 4 
years) towards machinery and equipment, f a c t o r y bu i ld ings , and 
employees' dwellings respectively. In addition, companies may qual i fy 
f o r a 110 percent annual contr ibut ion to the cost of t r a in ing , a 10 
percent annual wage subsidy, and a 15 percent rebate of the actual 
costs of e l e c t r i c i t y , water and sewerage s e r v i c es on s i t e and 
transportation within SACU of raw materials and finished products over 
a per iod up to f i v e years5-*-. Not every company w i l l be granted 
'P ioneer ' status (which i s administered by the Pioneer Industr ies 
Board rather than LNDC) but i t appears that LNDC i s prepared to 
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negotiate contracts spec i f i ca l l y tai lored to the needs.of individual 
companies sometimes outs ide the normal p o r t f o l i o of incent i ves . 
Moreover, LNDC w i l l consider app l i ca t ions from non-manufacturing 
companies although only manufacturers, bui ld ing contrac tors and 
hote l/cas ino concerns w i l l be accorded 'P ioneer ' s tatus; indeed 39 
percent of LNDC-assisted companies operat ing in ea r l y 1984 were 
commercial or service concerns52. 
In terms of f inancial transfers and exchange control, Lesotho o f f e r s 
inves tors severa l advantages. F i r s t l y , inves tors are f r e e from 
exchange r e s t r i c t i o n s wi th in the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) of which 
Lesotho is a member along with Swaziland and South Africa. Secondly, 
p r o f i t s are f ree ly transferable outside RMA except where local credit 
f a c i l i t i e s exceed 25 percent of e f f e c t i v e foreign capital invested at 
the t ime of t rans fer ( in which cases r e s t r i c t i o n s may obta in ) . 
Thirdly, the re-transfer of the amount of equity capital or ig inal ly 
brought in by an investor is a l lowed and unres t r i c ted . Fourthly, as 
regards loans from outside RMA, permission to repay both principal arri 
i n t e r es t i s g iven at the same time as approval of the inward loan 
t r a n s f e r 5 3 . F i f t h l y , f i r m guaran t ees are p r ov i d ed a g a i n s t 
n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , and investors are f r e e from ob l i ga t i ons to assign 
shares to LKDC or other local interests. Finally, Lesotho has secured 
double taxation agreements with South Afr ica , United Kingdom and West 
Germany. 
But perhaps most important to po t en t i a l investors i s Lesotho's 
priv i leged access to a variety of local and international markets. As 
E.R. Sekhonyana, then Lesotho's Minister of Planning, Employment and 
Economic A f f a i r s , remarked in 1982: "Our f o r t e l i e s in the 
a c c e p t a b i l i t y of our products i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , in most cases on 
concessionary terms."54 
The s ing l e most important market a ccess ib l e from Lesotho is South 
Afr ica and i t s neighbouring states. As a member of SSCU, Lesotho-based 
indust r i es q u a l i f y f o r d u t y - f r e e entry in to South A f r i c a and other 
member countries, a factor that might interest multinationals hesitant 
to open or further operations in South Afr ica for po l i t i ca l reasons, 
or r e l a t i v e l y f o o t - l o o s e South A f r i can companies in teres ted in a 
' f r ee - lunch ' of concessions. Lesotho i s a l so a s ignatory to the 
various Yaounde and Lome trade conventions granting i t th= f a c i l i t y 
to export commodities to the EEC a t zero or much reduced rates of 
duty 5 5 . This concession app l i es both to goods whol ly produced in 
Lesotho and to goods comprising an import content provided that they 
have been ' s a t i s f a c t o r i l y transformed' 5 6 . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , a product 
need only have 25 percent 'value-added' in Lesotho to q u a l i f y f o r a 
Lesotho c e r t i f i c a t e of origin which means that goods produced in South 
Afr ica and ' f in ished-o f f ' in Lesotho can be exported pre ferent ia l ly to 
EEC markets. Although the quantities qual i fy ing for this treatment are 
l i m i t e d by quotas, c e i l i n g s and maximum-country amounts, under the 
A > 
Lome I I (1983-85) agreements, the General ised System of Pre ference 
(GSP) has been altered to introduce a system of d i f f e rent ia t i on in the 
al location of benefits. This irdividual isat ion of preferent ia l shares 
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has given less competitive exporters l ike Lesotho greater security in 
the European market. 
The Commonwealth and European countries outside the EEC also operate 
GSP schemes in favour of Lesotho. Japan and certain Eastern European 
countries grant preferential s i t r y at a variety of l eve ls for l is ted 
agricultural products and most industrial products are accorded either 
d u t y - f r e e entry or entry at 50 percent of the normal Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) rate . In add i t ion , the USA provides d u t y - f r e e b e n e f i t s 
fo r a l l l i s ted items and l i f t s quota restr ict ions on certain products. 
Lesotho also advertises i t s accessibi l i ty to the black African market 
on concessionary terms as an inducement to foreign investors. Lesotho 
i s a member of the Southern A f r i can Development Co-ordinat ion 
Conference (SADOC)57 and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA)58, and has 
signed trade agreements with Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique providing 
r ec ip roca l MFN discounts for the s i gna to r i e s ' exports . I r o n i c a l l y , 
then, South A f r i can owned or South A f r i can based companies, by 
locating a subsidiary in Lesotho, can take advantage of markets which 
have been organised with the s p e c i f i c in tent ion of reducing the 
Republ ic 's economic power in the region. In short , Lesotho o f f e r s 
investors privi leged access to several lucrat ive overseas markets, and 
an opportunity to penetrate markets normally host i l e to South African 
based producers. As Scott Moahloli, Director of LNDC's New Industries 
Division, put i t to an audience of foreign businessman: 
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"Some of you may be seeking ways of entering 
the l u c r a t i v e markets of the EEC but may be 
worr ied about import dut i es or poss ib l e 
r e j e c t i o n on p o l i t i c a l grounds. For s im i l a r 
reasons, you may be put o f f attempting to 
tackle the rap id ly -growing markets in the 
black A f r i can countr ies . Non-South A f r i can 
companies among you may be wary of investing 
in the Republic because of possible po l i t i ca l 
repercussions back home. I f you think l i k e 
th i s , may I suggest that you owe i t to your 
company ard to your shareholders to at least 
consider the poss ib i l i ty of solving a l l these 
problems bv starting a manufacturing unit in 
Lesotho."5 9 
Progress 
In the absence o f comprehensive published data, the impact of LNDC 
policy upon the expansion of industrial anil commercial employment in 
Lesotho is d i f f i c u l t to assess with exact i tude 6®. One es t imate , 
though, i s tha t by 1980 4 000 j o b s have been c r e a t e d in the 
manufacturing sector as a d i rect result of IflDC's a c t i v i t i e s since i ts 
inception in 19676*-. No comparable f igure for the commercial sector i s 
at tend but, given the sectoral breakdowns published in the 1980 and 
1981 Annual Reports and in subsequent LNDC News l e t t e r s one might 
expect i t to be of a similar order. Of course, in r e l a t i v e terms this 
represents a qu i t e considerable development of the rudimentary 
industrial base that existed in Lesotho at independence62. However, i f 
consideration is given to the fact that Lesotho needs to create over 
20 000 jobs per annum just to absorb new entrants to the labour 
market, UfflC's achievements appear more modest. Indeed, since 1978 -
the year in which LNDC's current incent i ves package was launched -
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U>1DC has managed to in i t i a t e projects generating on average only 1 000 
- 1 200 jobs per annum (see Table 1). 
TABLE 1: Jobs Created and P r o j e c t s I n i t i a t e d by LNDC, 1979/80 -
1983/84 
Financial year 
(March to March) No. Projects No. Jobs 
1979/801 13 917 
1980/812 10 782 
1981/823 22 1 360 
F irs t 6 months 
1983 6 870 
1983/845 12 1 300 
Sources: 
1. IflDC, Annual Report 1980, Maseru, 1981, p.6. 
2. LNDC, Annual Report 1981, Maseru, 1982, p.9. 
3. LNDC, Annual Report 1981, Maseru, 1982, p.6; and LNDC, "Bright 
Industr ies Outlook 1982", LNDC News le t te r , No. 2, Maseru, 1982, 
p.4. 
4. 124DC News le t te r , No. 3, Maseru, 1983, p.4. 1982/83 f i g u r e not 
avai lable. 
5. INDC Newsletter, No. 1, Maseru, 1984, p.3. 
Moreover, wh i l s t LNDC's unprecedented success in 1981 led to 
expectat ions that the "encouraging upward trend" would continue and 
even acce l e ra t e , th is has not been r ea l i s ed to da te 6 3 . Nonetheless 
LNDC remains o p t i m i s t i c s ince the disappointments of the past two 
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years have been blamed on general recessionary pressures rather than 
factors spec i f i c to Lesotho64. Thus, business is expected to pick up 
once the reg iona l economy recovers . Indeed, a recent LNDC survey of 
sixteen assisted manufacturing companies suggested that the majority 
(twelve) were trading prof i tably in la te 1983 and early 1984 while the 
remainder expected to return to p r o f i t a b i l i t y sho r t l y 6 5 . However, 
wh i l s t the recess ion has obv ious ly had an important impact on the 
situation in Lesotho, i t i s also clear that insuf f i c ient attention has 
been directed towards internal factors that a f f e c t Lesotho's ab i l i t y 
to compete fo r investment in the region. Yet , i f Lesotho i s to 
c a p i t a l i s e on the "very p o s i t i v e advances"66 i t has made to date , i t 
i s essential that these are awarded serious consideration. 
PROBLEMS WITH THE DJDC PROGRAMME 
Problems in Attracting Industry 
The f o l l ow ing is based l a r g e l y upon surveys67 of both manufacturing 
and non-manufacturirg companies located in metropolitan South Afr ica 
f> ft 
(Durban, East London and B loemfonte in ) 0 0 and in three ' pe r iphera l ' 
locations - Lesotho (Maseru and Maputsoe), Transkei (Butterworth and 
Umtata), and KwaZulu (Isithebe)6 9 . As regards the metropolitan survey, 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 are relevant to the concerns of this paper. Table 2, 
for example, r e f l e c t s attitudes towards investing capital in Lesotho, 
Transkei and KwaZulu. From th i s i t i s c l ear that both Transkei and 
KwaZulu are considered more su i tab l e fo r c ap i t a l investment than 
Lesotho, only 12 of the sample of 129 companies expecting Lesotho to 
become more important as a s i t e for capital investment, compared to 41 
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and 25 in the cases of Transkei and KwaZulu respectively. Tables 3 
and 4 r e f l e c t the re la t i ve importance of what were considered tu be 
the most s igni f icant advantages and disadvantages of locating capital 
in Lesotho, Transkei and KwaZulu, averaging the responses over the 
three samples. These data are complemented by Tables 5, 6, and 7 
which provide analyses of (a) the reasons why South African and other 
foreign companies located in Lesotho, Transkei and KwaZulu, and (b) 
what they considered to be the major advantages and disadvantages of 
capital investment in these areas. 
TABLE 2: Metropolitan Survey : Attitudes Towards Capital Investmatl: 
in Lesotho, Transkei and KwaZulu 
Centre Lesotho Transkei KwaZulu 
(%)* (%) (%) 
Durban 14,0 18,0 36,0 
East London 2,0 49,0 4,1 
Bloemfontein 13,3 30,0 16,7 
A l l 9,3 31,8 19," 
* Figures re fer to the percentage of each sample expect ing 
a particular area to become more important as a location 
for capital investment. 
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TABIJ3 3: Metropolitan Survey : Advantages of Investing Capital in 
Lesotho, Transkei and KwaZulu. 
I tan Lesotho Transkei KwaZulu 
Composi te index* 
Incentives 1,57 1,45 1,48 
Cheap/plentiful labour 1,86 2,04 2,05 
Improved Access to 
^Local Market 1,99 2,13 1,98 
Lcme Convention 1,20 N/A N/A 
Others 1,21 1,54 1,29 
Compos i t e index i s c omp i l ed by cod ing ' v e r y i m p o r t a n t ' , 
'marg ina l ly important ' and 'not important ' responses 3, 2 and 1 
respectively and averaging over the number of responses. 
TABIE 4: Metropolitan Survey : Disadvantages of Investing Capital 
in Lesotho, Transkei and KwaZulu. 
Item Lesotho Transkei KwaZulu 
Composi te index* 
Market not large enough to 2,66 2,74 2,64 
j u s t i f y investment 
labour problems 2,16 2,03 2,10 
Infrastructural problems 2,27 1,95 2,14 
Bureaucratic problems 2,27 1,80 1,54 
Po l i t i ca l problans 2,45 1,80 1,63 
Market ins tab i l i t y and 
competition 2,12 1,92 2,17 
Distance from suppliers and 
other markets 2,04 1,69 1,73 
Others 1,28 1,28 1,32 
* See Table 3. 
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These f a c t o r s are discussed at more length below paying par t i cu la r 
attention to their implications for th= future prospects of industrial 
expansion in Lesotho and drawing comparisons, where appropriate, with 
the Transkei and KwaZulu results. 
'IftBLE 5: Survey of Companies in Lesotho, Transkei and Kwazulu : 
Relative Importance of Factors Influencing Decisions 
to Invest Capital in These Areas. 
Lesotho Transkei KwaZulu 
Factor 
Composite index * and Rank 
Incentives Manufacturing 
Non-manufacturing 
2,42 (2) 
1,25(4) 
2,61(1) 
1,38 (4) 
2, .80(1) 
Labour Manufacturing 
Non-manufactur ing 
2,67 (1) 
2,50(2) 
2,29 (2) 
2,31(2) 
2, .37 (2) 
'Push' Factors Manufacturing 
Non-manufactur ing 
1,58 (4) 
1,00 (5=) 
1,36 (4) 
1,08 (5) 
1, 90(3) 
Access to Regional 
Market 
Manufacturing 
Non-manufactur ing 
1,50(5=) 
1,50(3) 
1,50(3) 
1,85 (3) 
1, 73(4) 
Access to Local 
Market 
Manufacturing 
Non-manufactur ing 
1,25(7) 
2,75(1) 
1,11(5) 
2,85 (1) 
1, 07 (6) 
A / 
Lome Convention Manufacturing 
Non-manufactur ing 
1,75 (3) 
1,00(5=) 
N/A N/A 
Others Manufacturing 
Non-manufactur ing 
1,50(5=) 
1,00 (5=) 
1.07 (6) 
1.08 (6) 
1, 40(5) 
* See Table 3. 
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TABLE 6: Survey of Companies in Lesotho, Transkei and KwaZulu : 
Advantages of Investing Capital 
Item 
Lesotho 
Composite 
Transkei 
index *and 
KwaZulu 
Rank 
Incentives and 
Assistance 
Manufacturing 
Non-manufactur ing 
2,92 (1=) 
1,75(3) 
2,93(1) 
1,23(4) 
3,00(1) 
Cheap/plen t i fu l 
labour 
Manufacturing 
Non-manufactur ing 
2,92 (1=) 
2,25(2) 
2,68 (2) 
2,69 (2) 
2,80 (2) 
Improved Access to 
Local market 
Manufacturing 
Non-manufacturing 
2,00 (3=) 
3,00(1) 
1,84 (3) 
2,92 (1) 
1,16 (4) 
A ' Lome Convaition Manufacturing 
Non-manufactur ing 
2,00(3=) 
1,00 (5) 
N/A N/A 
Others Manufacturing 
Non-manufacturing 
1,40 (5) 
1,57 (4) 
1,42 (4) 
1,50(3) 
1,45(3) 
* See Table 3. 
( i ) Incentives 
The provision of incentives and other forms of assistance from LNDC is 
c lear ly a major determinant of decisions to invest in Lesotho (Table 
5) f o r manufacturing companies. In add i t ion , Table 6 ind ica ts that 
LNDC ass is tance i s a lso important f o r commercial , s e r v i c e and 
construction companies in comparison to similar companies in Transkei 
and KwaZulu where assistance of this type is not generally available. 
However, i t i s a l so c l ea r that the basic package of incent i ves on 
o f f e r in Lesotho i s i n f e r i o r to those o b t a i n i n g a t most 
'deconcentrat ion ' s i t e s and ' i ndus t r i a l development po ints ' in both 
'wh i te ' South A f r i c a and the bantustans7®. Moreover, wh i l s t the 
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decen t r a l i s a t i on incent i ves in South A f r i c a were made considerably 
more a t t r a c t i v e in A p r i l 1982, LNDC has been using the same 
package s ince 1978. Thus, as a consultancy commissioned by LNDC has 
recently suggested, Lesotho's competitiveness as an investment s i t e is 
71 
steadily declining. Furthermore, i t was clear from the metropolitan 
survey that i n d u s t r i a l i s t s are r a the r b e t t e r in fo rmed about 
decentralisation incentives (which receive substantial coverage in the 
media) than 
TABLE 7: Survey of Companies in Lesotho, Transkei and KwaZulu : 
Disadvantages of Investing Capital 
Item Lesotho 
Composite 
Transkei 
index *and 
KwaZulu 
Rank 
Labour problems Manufacturing 
Non-manufactur ing 
2,67 (2) 
2,38 (4=) 
2,50(1) 
2,46(1=) 
2,46(1) 
Infrastructural 
problans 
Manufacturing 
Non-manufactur ing 
2,50(3) 
2,38(4=) 
2,10(2) 
2,09 (4) 
1,96(4) 
Bureaucratic 
problems 
Manufacturing 
Non-manufactur ing 
2,36(4) 
2,29(6) 
1,91(5) 
2,00 (6) 
1,44 (6) 
P o l i t i c a l problems Manufacturing 
Non-manufactur ing 
2,83(1) 
2,88(1) 
1,60(7) 
1,50(8) 
1,15(8) 
Local market 
problems 
Manufacturing 
non-manufacturing 
1,80 (8) 
2,75(2) 
1,20(8) 
2,46(1=) 
1,20(7) 
Distance from supp-
l i e s and SA markets 
Manufacturing 
Non-manufacturing 
2,33 (5) 
2,13(7) 
2,00 (4) 
2,08(5) 
1,68 (5) 
Staf f ing problems Manufacturing 
Non-manufactur ing 
2,20 (6) 
2,50(3) 
2,04(3) 
2,10 (3) 
2,07 (2) 
Other Manufacturing 
Non-manufacturing 
2,17(7) 
2,00(8) 
1,85 (6) 
1,55 (7) 
2,05(3) 
* See Table 3. 
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those on o f f e r in Lesotho, wh i l s t some respondents mentioned 
d i f f i c u l t i e s in weighing up incent ives which are not d i r e c t l y 
comparable such as Lesotho's tax ho l iday - i t s most s i g n i f i c a n t 
concess ion 7 2 - with decen t ra l i s a t i on wage subsid ies . So, as Prime 
Minister Chief Jonathan has pointed out: "The main worry i s that we 
are competing with an economic giant which can o f f e r better incentives 
to investors than we can ... competition is s t i f f . " 7 3 
( i i ) Labour 
From Tables 3, 5 and 6 i t i s ev ident that the a v a i l a b i l i t y of cheap 
and p lent i fu l labour i s considered to be an important advantage of a 
Lesotho l o ca t i on f o r both manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
companies, arid therefore a major determinant of decisions to invest in 
Leso tho . At p r e s e n t , l abour i s cheap in Leso tho r e l a t i v e to 
metropo l i tan South A f r i c a , wage ra tes being roughly comparable to 
those obtaining in the bantustans. Moreover, g i ven that Lesotho's 
educational system i s rather be t t e r developed than those in the 
bantustans, Basotho labour is r e la t i ve l y more l i t e ra t e and numerate, 
and hence l e s s c o s t l y fo r investors to t ra in . Thus, our respondents 
tended to be more c r i t i c a l of the p roduc t i v i t y of Zulu and Xhosa 
workers than Basotho74 (see Table 7 for instance). 
Never the less , labour was seen to be problemat ic in other ways (see 
Tables 4 and 7). For example, many respondents complained about high 
l e v e l s o f turnover 7 5 and absenteeism and the d i f f i c u l t i e s they had 
encountered in r ec ru i t ing s k i l l e d workers, f i r i n g employees 7 6 , and 
23 
r e s i s t i n g o f f i c i a l pressure to appoint (what they considered to be) 
redundant s t a f f . However , the m a j o r i t y o f companies seemed 
part icularly concerned about the possible impact of union organisation 
on the p r i c e of labour s ince, in sharp contras t to the bantustans, 
Basotho unions have a remarkably long h i s t o r y and have made very 
77 signi f icant advances in recent years. 
In pa r t i cu l a r , the l a t e 1970s and ea r l y 1980s saw the format ion o f 
severa l new unions which organised p r i n c i p a l l y in the industr ies 
established under the auspices of UtfDC and, heavily influenced by the 
development of independent trade unions in South A f r i c a , "sought to 
contest wages and conditions in ventures which were themselves often 
under South African ownership and control".78 Meanwhile, the Lesotho 
Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU - formerly the Basutoland Federation 
o f Labour; BFL) - the most p o w e r f u l o f the two t rade union 
federations in Lesotho - has successfully consolidated i ts position in 
a wide range of sectors. Thus, whilst LNDC advises potential investors 
that "most employees do rot belong to trade unions"79, Roger Southall 
c a l cu l a t e s that poss ib ly 20 000 out of a 25 000-strong ' i n t e rna l 
working class' are members of unions.8® 
Moreover, although the development of a more mi l i tant union movement 
in Lesotho would appear p r e j u d i c i a l to i t s indust r ia l s t ra t egy , the 
government has been unable or unwi l l ing to engage in the kind of 
r epress i ve t a c t i c s that are employed in a p lace l i k e C i ske i . 8 1 
Certainly, in i t s dealings with the unions the state had consistently 
moved with the in t e r es t s of f o r e i gn cap i t a l c l e a r l y in mind. In 
reviewing minimum wage leve ls , for example, the Wages Advisory Board 
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takes into account " increases in the cost of l i v i n g as w e l l as the 
8 2 
need to c rea te more jobs f o r Basotho in Lesotho"(emphasis added). 
S i m i l a r l y , in his address to a LNDC workshop on labour r e l a t i o n s in 
March 1982, E. R. Sekhonyana explained that the government wanted to 
es tab l i sh "good labour r e l a t i o n s " f o r without such r e l a t i o n s , 
companies that have es tab l i shed themselves in Lesotho might f e e l 
unwanted or at worst threatened and unprotected".8 3 Ye t , w h i l s t the 
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government has continued to harass certain unions arri their leaders , 
this has had less impact that i t might lave anticipated on the growth 
of unions outs ide the Lesotho Council of Workers (LCW) which en joys 
state support. For example, an attempt by the government in 1974 to 
declare LCW - now led by Simon Jonathan, a close re la t i ve of the Prime 
Minister - the only legit imate labour representative was foresta l led 
by employers in recognition of the fact that the majority of workers 
were members of unions a f f i l i a t e d to BFL. As a r e s u l t , BFL was 
incorporated into the bargaining process and accepted by both the 
Labour Department and the Employers' association. Similarly, although 
the government has cons i s t en t l y supported moves to draw a l l unions 
in to one f ede ra t i on dominated by LCW, the formation o f the 'Lesotho 
Congress of Free Trade Unions' in June 1984 was e f f e c t e d without 
concessions to state control of union ac t i v i t i e s on the part of LFTU 
arri the independent member unions.85 
Never the less , one should s t ress that , g iven the nature of Lesotho's 
labour-surplus economy and the government's e f f o r t s to entioe foreign 
companies to the country, Basotho unions are obliged to operate within 
a very r e s t r i c t i v e set of constra ints . As Southal l comments : 
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"Lesotho's trade unions remain subject to a l l the disadvantages 
which accrue from operating within a labour reserve. First they 
labour under the aeg is of a s ta te which - w h i l s t serving the 
immediate interests of the core petty bourgeoisie - i s dominated, 
d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y , by South A f r i can and f o r e i g n c a p i t a l . 
Consequently, the industr ia l r e l a t i ons framework wi th in which 
they seek to further workers' interests promotes the object ives 
of c a p i t a l . In e f f e c t , the laws and prac t i ces which regu la te 
trade unions in Lesotho (e.g. s ta te determinat ion of how unions 
may cons t i tu t e the i r own f edera t i ons , de f a c t o contro l by 
government over whether unions may r e g i s t e r , a c o l l e c t i v e 
bargaining convention whereby firms do not deal with unions unti l 
they represent more than half the number of workers they employ, 
and so on) disorganise the workforce in a manner which does not 
apply to capital . Second, and fundamentally, trade unions have to 
operate within a context where an enormous reserve army of labour 
is v i r tua l ly camped outside each set of factory gates. Clearly, 
there are very severe l imi ts to what unions can do." 
Thus, wh i l s t i t i s not true that " s t r i k e s are unknown"87 in Lesotho, 
fourteen of the sixteen companies included INDC's recent survey had 
experienced no s t r i k es in an aggregate ex i s tence of 55 years . 8 8 
Moreover, i t i s obvious that both the Wages Advisory Board and the 
Labour Department are rather more s e n s i t i v e to the in t e r es t s of 
foreign investors than those of workers. For example, employers have 
expressed strong opposition to survey evidence submitted recently to 
the Wages Advisory Board that recommends very substantial increases in 
minimum wage ra tes . In pa r t i cu la r , one of the employers who 
participated in our investigation (and who occupies positions in both 
the Employers' association and the Wages Advisory Board) warned that 
he and many o the r i n v e s t o r s would have t o ' r e c o n s i d e r t h e i r 
a ssoc i a t i on with Lesotho' i f increases in the minimum wage ra tes 
exceeded 50 percent (i.e. R60 per month to R90 per month in the lowest 
category). Clearly, given the fact that foreign investors usually have 
very l i t t l e capital actually tied down in Lesotho and are repatriating 
p r o f i t s annually, these threats have to be taken ser ious ly . The 
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government of Lesotho, therefore, faces the d i f f i c u l t task of finding 
a compromise that w i l l sa t i s f y both the employers and the unions. 
However, i t i s a l so c l ea r to employers that the union movement in 
Lesotho i s deve loping rap id l y along with i t s po t en t i a l a b i l i t y to 
mobilise workers and sustain labour action. So, whereas few companies 
in our survey had ac tua l l y been a f f e c t e d by s t r i k e s to date , most 
respondents ant i c ipa ted that labour d isputes would esca la te in the 
short term. I t i s i n e v i t a b l e , then, that Lesotho's compet i t i veness 
r e l a t i v e to the bantustans, where unions are uncommon i f not outlawed 
altogether, w i l l deteriorate. In fact , several respondents argued that 
Basotho labour was already ' overpr iced ' and that 'one or two big 
strikes' would 'scare-of f investors for good'. 
( i i i ) The Local Market 
Access to the l o ca l market i s a l so an important determinant of 
d e c i s i o n s to i n v e s t c a p i t a l in Leso tho ( Tab l es 3, 5 and 6) 
part icularly for commercial, service and construction companies. I t is 
apparent, though, that potential investors (Table 3) are rather more 
interested in the public sector market which they consider to be 
more l u c r a t i v e and r e l i a b l e . Ce r ta in l y , the rapid increases in the 
value of in te rna t i ona l aid disbursed to Lesotho (on remarkably 
O Q 
generous terms) over the past few years 0 ' has attracted the attention 
of companies that stand to p r o f i t from government contracts. Moreover, 
whilst several of our respondents commented unfavourably on what they 
saw as bureaucrat ic corrupt ion in Lesotho, i t was agreed that 
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corruption provided ample opportunities for 'making a fast buck'.9® 
On the other hand, the Lesotho market was a lso considered to be 
disadvantageous for capital investment in several respects (Tables 4 
and 7) , although companies in Maseru and Maputsoe s e l l i n g over 50 
percent of their output to local customers tended to be more confident 
than others. The major reasons fo r a negat i ve eva luat ion of the 
domestic market were (a) an expectation that private purchasing power 
w i l l develop very slowly given the uncertain future of migrant labour, 
and (b) the fear that international donors w i l l intervene to constrain 
the p r e s e n t l e v e l o f e x p e n d i t u r e on the pa r t o f the Leso tho 
government. The general fee l ing, then, appeared to be that the Lesotho 
market is essent ia l ly a r t i f i c i a l , buttressed by external i n f l ows of 
c ap i t a l in the form of in ternat iona l aid and migrant remit tances. 
Thus, as one respondent put i t : " I just don't see th i s becoming a 
sophis t i ca ted market. There are good oppor tuni t i es in the publ ic 
sector but I can't see us sel l ing much to the locals." 
Furthermore, wh i l s t severa l of our respondents suggested that the 
Lesotho market was s t i l l 'wide open' in several sectors, others f e l t 
that competition was already severe from both locally-based and South 
Q-l 
African concerns . In addition, many companies were c r i t i c a l of poor 
infrastructural links within tte Lesotho market. Most complaints were 
d i r ec t ed at the t ransportat ion network but poor communications by 
post, telephone and telex were also mentioned regularly. The general 
f e e l i n g , t h e r e f o r e , appeared to be that Lesotho's f u l l market 
po t en t i a l would not be r ea l i s ed u l t i l i t had been 'opened-up' by 
fu r the r development of i t s communications networks. F i n a l l y , a 
s ign i f i cant number of companies in both the metropolitan and Lesotho 
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surveys complained about bureaucrat ic muddles and the f a c t that 
competitive tenders for public sector cont rac ts tended to be turned 
down in favour of ' i n f l a t e d ' b ids from favoured companies. Thus, one 
respondent commented that "unless you take care of the right people, 
you have l i t t l e chance of securing a contract". Interest ingly, Lesotho 
was seen to be cons iderably more problemat ic in th i s respect than 
e i the r KwaZulu and Transkei. S i m i l a r l y , a s i g n i f i c a n t l y l a r g e 
proportion of our respondents mentioned problems related to the non-
payment or l a t e payment of b i l l s on the part of Basotho c l i e n t s ; to 
c i t e the remark of one i n d u s t r i a l i s t : "Not even bank-guaranteed 
cheques are safe"9 2 . 
~ / ( i v ) The Lome Convention 
A ' 
There is l i t t l e doubt that the Lome Convention i s an extremely 
important determinant of decisions to invest in Lesotho for companies 
intending to export a large proportion of output overseas. One Maseru 
company, for example, which manufactures beachwear, s e l l s nearly 100 
percent of i t s stock to the U.S.A. Similarly, Lesotho Umbrella, based 
in Matutsoe, markets v i r tua l ly i t s entire output in Europe, mostly to go i t s West German distr ibutor. However, the evidence suggests that for 
A / 
the m a j o r i t y of companies the Lome Convention i s not a s i g n i f i a n t 
f a c t o r at present (Tables 3, 5 and 6). In our sample of twenty 
companies in Maseru and Maputsoe only f i v e were exporting overseas -
an average 23 percent by value. Moreover, w h i l s t Lome was "the only 
reason we decided to come to Lesotho" f o r one company s e l l i n g 90 
percent of i t s output overseas, i t was considered only "use fu l " by 
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another company marketing roughly 30 percent overseas as part of a 
package of attractions of which cheap labour appeared to be the most 
important. S i m i l a r l y , the LNDC survey found that "the concessional 
trade advantages available to Lesotho were mentioned by a number of 
firms; however, the small proportion of c l ients outside the Republic 
of South A f r i c a would seem to ind icate that there i s considerable 
potential for an expansion of exports".94 
But whereas th is po ten t ia l obviously e x i s t s and i s l i k e l y to be 
exploited rather more in the future, i t was clear from our interviews 
with companies in the metropolitan areas that, i f attempts to entice 
South A f r i can investors are to be continued, LNDC would do we l l to 
adver t i se the Lome f ac to r more v igorous ly since the ma j o r i t y of 
respondents appeared to have very l i t t l e knowledge and understanding 
of i t . Indeed, a surprisingly large number of our informants claimed 
not to have heard of the Convention at a l l . From the point of view of 
LNDC, then, t h i s i s an e x t r e m e l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y s i t u a t i o n , 
part icularly given the fact that concessional trade advantages is the 
one incentive that i t s bantustan competitors cannot match. 
(v) Po l i t i ca l and Bureaucratic Problons 
Tables 4 and 7 indicate that Lesotho is considered s igni f icant ly more 
problematic than either Transkei or KwaZulu in terms of po l i t i ca l and 
bureaucrat ic problems. As regards the p o l i t i c a l s i tua t i on , whereas 
Transkei and KwaZulu were seen as re la t i ve ly 'safe' for the purposes 
of investment, there was a marked lack of confidence in Lesotho among 
companies that participated in our surveys. Concern was expressed at 
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three levels . In the f i r s t place i t was argued that a deterioration of 
relations between Maseru and Pretoria has a serious e f f e c t on business 
through the imposi t ion of border r e s t r i c t i o n s , as in the 1976 
'Transkeian emergency', for example, and again in May, June and July, 
198395. Furthermore, i t was suggested that Lesotho might subsequently 
r e t a l i a t e against South A f r ican investors by na t i ona l i s ing the i r 
businesses or by increasing corporate taxation. Certainly i t is true 
that Lesotho has assumed an increas ing ly b e l l i g e r e n t posture in 
respect of South A f r i c a and i t s apartheid p o l i c i e s s ince the ea r l y 
1970's.96 And, wh i l s t one may argue that the Lesotho government's 
present pol icy has been dictated more by i t s need to suppress internal 
c r i t i c i s m of i t s ea r l y c o l l a b o r a t i v e pos i t i on and by the l o ca l 
p o l i t i c s of in ternat iona l aid than a s e l f l e s s d e s i r e to support the 
l iberation struggle9 7 , i t has been received with intene i r r i ta t ion in 
Pre tor ia never the less . The South A f r i can ra id on Maseru in December 
1982 bears testimony to P re to r ia ' s concern. Moreover, P re to r ia i s 
c lear ly becoming increasingly frustrated by Maseru's dogged refusal to 
sign a non-aggression pact on the l ines of the Nkomati Accord98 arri by 
i t s consistent claims of South African complicity in the ' t e r ror is t ' 
a c t i v i t i e s of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA)99. At present, then, 
whilst the situation las improved considerably over the f i r s t half of 
1983, there seems l i t t l e prospect that the current tension w i l l 
diminish in the short term. 
Secondly, a number of respondents argued that the internal c o n f l i c t 
between the ru l ing Basotho National Party (BNP) and the Basutoland 
Congress Party (BCP). and i ts mi l i tary wing, the LLA, would discourage 
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investors from locating in Lesotho. However, there seemed more concern 
about the occasional act of violence - particularly bomb explosions-*-®® 
- than the co l l apse of the Jonathan government. Never the less , there 
was some speculat ion that a BCP government - commonly conceived as 
more ' r ad i c a l ' than the present BNP - would be l e ss sympathetic to 
South African corporate investment. Final ly, several of our informants 
were alarmed by what they saw as a ' l e f t w a r d ' d r i f t in Lesotho. The 
government's support f o r the ANC and the recent establ ishment of 
diplomatic relations with inter a l ia the Soviet Union, Cuba and China 
were considered i n d i c a t i v e of th i s d r i f t . In add i t ion , Jonathan's 
expulsion of the (capita l ist ) Taiwanese diplomatic community in May 
1983 and the i r replacement by communist Chinese was regarded as 
especial ly s igni f icant1®1 , part icularly given the fact that Taiwanese 
investors are currently displaying an unprecedented leve l of interest 
1 0? 
in the region. In short, although none of our respondents had been 
d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by ' p o l i t i c a l ' problems other than border de lays , 
Lesotho was de f in i t e l y thought to be somewhat risky in this respect, 
and certainly more so than i t s competitors. 
As regards bureaucratic problems, the major complaints appeared to be 
i n e f f i c i e n c y , corrupt ion, higher corporate taxat ion than in South 
Afr ica (i.e. where companies are not receiving tax concessions), the 
d i f f i c u l t y of obtaining work permits for expatriate s t a f f , regulations 
obliging employers to hire Basotho in preference to expatriates, and 
the a l l eged d i f f i c u l t y of f i r i n g Basotho employees. Many companies 
a l so complained about apparent incompetence in the handling of 
business matters by the government and LNDC. "They seem to want us 
here", commented one respondent, "but they make things d i f f i c u l t for 
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us at every turn." The general impression, therefore, was that Lesotho 
is considered a much more 'al ien' business environment even by companies 
in the metropolitan surveys which lad ro first-hand experience of the 
situation. This i s c lear ly the result of the very negative press that 
Lesotho receives inside South A f r i ca . 
( v i ) Other Problems 
Many companies found aspec t s o f the Leso tho i n f r a s t r u c t u r e 
part icularly problematic. S igni f icant ly , the factor scores for this 
item were much higher in Lesotho than in e i the r KwaZulu or Transkei 
(see Tables 4 and 7). Poor communicat ions ( p a r t i c u l a r l y road 
transport, border delays and telephones) and ine f f i c i en t u t i l i t i e s 1 0 3 
were the most common complaints. A comparable number of respondents 
a lso found transport costs to be a problem given the pos i t i on of 
Lesotho with respect to their suppliers and major markets within South 
Afr ica . 1 0 4 Again, the factor scores on this item suggest that Lesotho 
is considered more problematic in this respect than either Transkei or 
KwaZulu, although th i s may be at l eas t pa r t l y due to the r a i l a g e 
subs id i za t ion that i s a va i l ab l e to manufacturing companies in 
bantustan locations (see Tables 4 and 7). Final ly a s igni f icant number 
of respondents expressed concern about the d i f f i c u l t i e s they had 
encountered in persuading competent white managerial and professional 
s ta f f to accept positions in Lesotho along with problems of personal 
and work-place s e c u r i t y 1 0 5 . Surpr is ing ly , Lesotho once again scored 
more highly on this item than either Transkei or KwaZulu (see Table 
7) despite the fact that, res ident ia l ly and soc ia l ly , Maseru - where 
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most f o r e i g n inves tors have located - i s probably super ior to any 
location inside these areas.106 I t was evident, then, that Maseru's 
low popu lar i t y had more to do with the perce ived h o s t i l i t y of the 
people and government and internal po l i t i ca l instabi l i ty than with i t s 
r e l a t i v e attractiveness as a residence. 
In summary, LNDC faces very serious problems in i t s e f f o r t s to entice 
f o r e i g n inves tors to Lesotho. More important ly perhaps, on the 
evidence of our surveys, these problems are considered to be l e ss 
severe in at l eas t two of i t s compet i tors , KwaZulu and Transkei. 
Admit ted ly , some of these 'problems' are more perceptual than r ea l . 
Nevertheless, i t i s by no means clear what the government of Lesotho 
can do about the very negat ive image that the country has acquired 
among South A f r i c a n s in g e n e r a l and investors in pa r t i cu la r . 
Furthermore, Lesotho's problems are very real in the realms of labour 
and incentives and in this context i t i s c lear ly essential for LNDC to 
publicise i t s trade advantages ( i f the present industrial pol icy is to 
be continued)- about which r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e seems to be known in 
South Afr ica - rather more energetical ly than hitherto. 
Impact ipon the Economy 
The 'developmental ' impact of f o r e i gn corporate investment i s 
contingent upon i t s 'mult ipl ier ' e f f e c t s within the domestic economy. 
In the case of Lesotho, the evidence s t rong ly suggests that th is 
m u l t i p l i e r is present ly of l i m i t e d dimensions, and tends to ' d r i f t ' 
out of the local economy largely to the metropolitan centres of South 
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A f r i c a . The reasons f o r th is may be discussed under the f o l l ow ing 
headings: 
( i ) 'Forward Linkages' 
By generating a demand for manufactured inputs and services, foreign 
corporate investment should stimulate ac t i v i t y 'downstream' within the 
domestic economy. However, our survey suggests that the proportions of 
plant and service inputs being drawn loca l ly are negl ig ible. Only 0,6 
percent (by value) of plant inputs were acquired loca l ly ; 1,4 percent 
from the l o ca l r eg iona l cent re (Bloemfontein) 79 percent from the 
rest of South Afr ica , and 19 percent from overseas. Equivalent f igures 
for service inputs were 4,4 percent, 20,4 percent, 75,2 percent and 0 
percent. Moreover, where agglomeration economies have developed they 
appear to have encouraged fore ign companies to deve lop l inkages not 
with l o ca l concerns but with each other. But, wh i l s t there i s some 
l imited evidence of inter-l inkage between foreign companies, this did 
not seem to be common p rac t i c e , nor did i t appear to have been an 
important factor in their decisions to invest capital in Lesotho. 
( i i ) 'Backward Linkages' 
S i m i l a r l y , our survey showed that the proport ion of raw mate r i a l s 
drawn from Lesotho is also extremely low. On average, only 6,2 percent 
(by value) of a l l imported mate r i a l s were l o c a l , wh i l e 8,0 percent 
were shipped from Bloemfontein, 69,1 percent from the r e s t of South 
Afr ica, and 16,7 percent from overseas107. The major reasons for this 
were that suppl ies could not be obtained, or obtained cheaply 
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(because of infrastructural constraints) from Lesotho, or that foreign 
suppliers were considered more rel iable. Several companies do draw 
the bulk of their raw materials local ly - Loti Brick and the recently 
expanded Basotho Fru i t and Vegetable Cannery at Mazenod are two 
examples 1 0 8 - but these are except iona l . Even the tapestry and skin 
products indust r i es import most mohair and hides from South A f r i c a 
rather than Lesotho, although the lat ter is expected to make more use 
of local hides once Lesotho's National Abattoir begins operations109 . 
( i i i ) The Import B i l l 
INDC has frequently suggested that foreign corporate investmeit should 
reduce Lesotho's propensity to import from South Afr ica by providing 
the domestic market with cheaper products t a i l o r ed to meet l o ca l 
tas tes and the purchasing power of the Basotho consumer. Ce r ta in l y , 
the domestic market is important to the majority of foreign companies 
currently trading in Lesotho (although, in general, i t i s considered 
too small and unstable to interest most investors). In our survey, 100 
percent of sa les (by value) made by construct ion, se rv i ce and 
commercial companies were to the local market; the equivalent f igure 
f o r manufacturing companies was 45 percen t 1 1 0 . However, i t i s by no 
means c l ea r whether th is b e n e f i t s l o ca l consumers in any mater ia l 
sense since there i s no c lear evidence that import subst i tu tes are 
s ign i f i cant ly cheaper or more suited to the domestic market; indeed, 
there i s l i t t l e reason f o r them to be so g iven that Lesotho does not 
subscribe to p r o t e c t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s (except to underwrite l oca l 
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monopo l i es ) 1 1 1 and that producers import the bulk of their supplies 
and services from South Afr ica. 
( i v ) Local Commercial Development 
One of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Lesotho is i t s i n a b i l i t y to re ta in 
capital within the local economy. I t i s estimated that 80 percent of 
every Rand earned or remitted to Lesotho 'leaks' in one way or another 
to South A f r i c a 1 1 2 . This i s perhaps most ev ident in the spectacular 
growth of towns such as Ficksburg and Ma ta t i e l e which border onto 
Lesotho. Ficksburg, f o r example, was descr ibed as a 'boom town' in 
1978113. Moreover, i t i s c l ea r from our survey of 42 businesses 
trading there in 1983 that the 'boom' has continued s ince 45 percent 
of the businesses had been established since 1975 and 40 percent had 
de f in i t e plans to expand in the next couple of years. This was largely 
the r e su l t of a sharp r i s e in the volume and value of business from 
Lesotho; in our survey, an average of 58 percent of turnover was 
accounted fo r by Lesotho-based consumers - the equiva lent of R41 
m i l l i o n o f bus ine s s in 1982. Thus, LNDC has remarked that 
"since...most of the income that was generated in Lesotho or f lowed 
into the country found i t s way to the South A f r i can border towns 
immediately i t reached the consumers, Lesotho lost to South Afr ica the 
economic impact created by the multipl ier e f f e c t of this money"114. 
In response, LNDC has v igorous ly promoted the development of 
commercial concerns on Basotho s o i l . However, the l a r g e s t and most 
success ful of these in both the r e t a i l i n g and wholesal ing sectors 
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- such as Metro and 0 K Bazaars - have been South African owned. Metro 
(Lesotho), for example, has been particularly successful in Lesotho. 
Commencing business with one Cash and Carry in Maseru, Metro now has 
s ix o u t l e t s in the major populat ion centres , increasing sa les and 
p r o f i t s be f o r e tax on average 57 percent p.a. and 101 percent p.a. 
respect ively1 1 5 . Thus, one might argue that UiDC is succeeding only in 
rep lac ing a system of ' d i r e c t ' with ' i n d i r e c t ' leakage, and is 
actually assisting South African businesses to penetrate the Lesotho 
market. On the other hand, though, the programme does succeed in 
c rea t ing jobs l o c a l l y and providing the in f ras t ruc ture f o r an 
expansion of r e t a i l a c t i v i t i e s . The government claims, fo r example, 
that whilst the or ig inal decision to allow Metro to trade in Lesotho 
was opposed by local commercial interests on the grounds that Metro 
would monopolise the market116, the establishment of wholesalers has 
generated far more l o ca l l y - run r e t a i l a c t i v i t y than hitherto1 1 7 . In 
addition, LiJDC argues that Lesotho-based concerns - whether local or 
f o r e i g n - w i l l be more inc l ined to draw products from the domestic 
economy. 0 K Bazaars, f o r example, buys a share of i t s f r u i t and 
vege tab les from the wholesaler Sunripe Fru i t s (Lesotho) which, in 
turn, imports supplies from the Mazenod Cannery and local farmers118. 
At the moment, though, such linkages are uncommon. 
(v ) Local Ownership and Pro f i t Sharing 
Whilst LNDC does contribute equity capital to assist foreign corporate 
investment, i t i s not in a pos i t i on to invest in more than a few 
companies at a time. Moreover, given that LNDC has suffered losses on 
certain investments and that i t also needs to retain a capital pool to 
38 
assist new investors, UTOC has found i t necessary per iodica l ly to se l l 
o f f some holdings to p r i v a t e in t e res t s . Thus, as noted above, the 
l e v e l of ' l o c a l ' ownership of ass is ted companies i s dec l in ing 
steadily. So, while LNDC w i l l continue to seek equity participation in 
c e r ta in companies ( f o r ' s t r a t e g i c ' reasons and where the l e v e l of 
investment is substantial), most w i l l be majority or f u l l y owned by 
f o r e i gn c a p i t a l s . In add i t ion , g iven LNDC's shortage of manpower at 
the Board l e v e l , de f a c t o f o r e i g n contro l i s l i k e l y to obtain even 
where LNDC i s the m a j o r i t y shareholder. C l e a r l y , t h i s has important 
implications for p ro f i t sharing since private companies are urrier no 
obligation to remit any share of p ro f i t s or dividends to their tosts 
beyorri company taxation. 
Furthermore, there seems l i t t l e prospect that LNDC w i l l be able to 
ex t rac t s i g n i f i c a n t concessions on p r o f i t - s h a r i n g from f o r e i gn 
companies in the future since these would further diminish Lesotho's 
c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s r e l a t i v e t o ' g rowth p o i n t ' l o c a t i o n s in the 
bantustans. Indeed, several companies in our survey were quite host i le 
to local shareholding, preferring to have, as one respondent put i t , 
"as l i t t l e to do with them as poss ib l e " . In sum, t h e r e f o r e , p r o f i t -
sharing presently contributes very l i t t l e to the Lesotho economy and 
the ' internal ' multipl ier generated by foreign investment. 
A f ina l point which merits discussion at this juncture is the question 
of company turnover. Wi l l companies be more inclined to disinvest once 
their concessions have expired, or w i l l inert ia l factors persuade them 
to continue operat ions at lower p r o f i t s ? Since the major incent i ve 
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runs for six years, i t i s perhaps too early to speculate on the l ike ly 
response. Clearly, though, LNDC is keen to minimise company turnover 
and the attendant disruption. In the f i r s t place, d i f f i c u l t i e s may be 
encountered in replacing companies that decide to dis invest; secondly, 
any turnover raises administrative and advertising costs, the leve l of 
LNDC capital investment (particularly investment into infrastructural 
alterat ions to the speci f icat ions of the immigrating companies), and 
of course the concessionary b i l l paid by LNDC. In our own survey, we 
found our informants reluctant to comment on corporate pol icy in this 
respect. However, the majority - p a r t i c u l a r l y those wi th r e l a t i v e l y 
l i t t l e c ap i t a l invested in Lesotho - could not v i s u a l i s e the i r 
companies continuing to function without incentives. But perhaps more 
disturbing was the suggestion that companies would migrate to other 
concessionary l oca t i ons in the reg ion once the i r incent ives had 
expired in Lesotho. Indeed, we do have evidence that a couple of South 
A f r i can companies have already l e f t Lesotho f o r more favourable 
l o ca t i ons wi th in the bantustans. I t i s poss ib l e , t h e r e f o r e , that 
'assisted' companies w i l l be able to re-negotiate their contracts once 
the i r incent i ves have expired (as in the bantustans); in f a c t , t h i s 
may be necessary to keep ce r ta in businesses a f l o a t which f ind 
themselves unable to compete e f f e c t i v e l y without ass is tance. The 
state's burden is also l ike ly to be increased by fraudulent claims on 
the part of 'assisted' companies (non-existent machinery and training 
schemes, for example) and by 'lame ducks' - uncompetitive businesses 
l oca t ing in Lesotho p r imar i l y to make quick p r o f i t s on the bas is of 
concessions. In such instances, LNDC w i l l have to dec ide whether to 
bale out the company and keep i t viable at an increased cost to i t s e l f 
or to withdraw, waste i t s investment and lose the jobs. 
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( v i ) The Labour Market 
Examining the statements and pub l i ca t ions issued by LNDC and the 
Lesotho government, i t i s c lear that the major b e n e f i t of f o r e i gn 
corporate investment is considered to be the expansion of employment 
oppor tuni t i es . I t i s a lso suggested that f o r e i gn companies w i l l 
generate a m u l t i p l i e r e f f e c t wi thin the labour market by upgrading 
s k i l l s to ar t i san l e v e l and by g i v i ng Basotho the opportunity to 
p ra c t i c e p r o f e s s i o n a l l y ( in accountancy and business administration 
for example), gain exper ience and eventua l l y move in to managerial 
positions, or set up their own businesses. But, besides the fact that 
the ra te o f job c rea t i on i s far too slow to make more than a t iny 
imprint upon Lesotho's unemployment problem, several aspects of the 
labour situation are problematic. 
In the f i r s t p lace , wh i l s t the ma j o r i t y of ' ass i s t ed ' companies in 
Lesotho are 'small' or 'medium' s ized1 1 9 , there is l i t t l e evidence of 
bias towards the more labour-intensive sectors (such as t ex t i l e s and 
c lo th ing ) . Nor i s there any ind icat ion that ' a ss i s t ed ' companies are 
more l abour - in t ens i ve than the i r metropol i tan competitors, or that 
they have become more labour-intensive as a result of re-location to 
Lesotho. There i s , o f course, l i t t l e reason to expect Lesotho to 
become a haven for labour-intensive irdustries given that UTOC o f f e r s 
no s i g n i f i c a n t labour incent ives . Indeed, severa l companies that 
pa r t i c ipa t ed in our inves t i ga t i on pointed out that ( to borrow the 
words of one respondent) " l abour - in tens i ve indust r i es w i l l not 
consider Lesotho before the homelands". Furthermore, i t i s not clear 
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exac t l y how companies that are l abour - in tens i ve r e l a t i v e to the i r 
compet i tors are expected to compete success fu l l y in the long run 
except by suppressing demands for higher wages. Hence, Lesotho i s 
unlikely to attract labour-intensive industries unless (a) the state 
i s prepared to prov ide wage subsidies , and (b) employers can 
successfully res ist pressure for higher wages. 
Second l y , v i r t u a l l y a l l the j o b s c r e a t e d f o r Basotho in our 
investigation were unskilled . Very few of the companies employed 
locals in a professional or managerial capacity, nor did they appear 
to have any intent ion o f doing s o 1 2 1 , desp i t e the f ac t that most 
managers claimed to have experienced d i f f i c u l t i e s in prising competent 
whites away from their jobs in the c i t i e s even where incentives were 
a v a i l a b l e to cover the r e l oca t i on and housing of 'key personnel*. 
Furthermore, within companies which were partly owned by LNDC - where 
some pressure i s appl ied to p lace l o c a l s in managerial pos i t i ons -
there was s t i l l a tendency to reserve s ens i t i v e pos i t i ons f o r 
expa t r i a t e s . Of course, the lack of s k i l l e d loca l labour m i l i t a t e s 
against the employment of Basotho in cer ta in pos i t i ons - and some 
companies have i n i t i a t e d t r a i n i n g schemes f o r a r t i s a n s and 
admin is t ra t i ve s t a f f (where such schemes are subsidised) to help 
1 OT 
resolve the s i t u a t i o n 1 " - but most seem prejudiced towards automation 
and d e - s k i l l e d assembly- l ine production and the maintenance of an 
expatr iate presence. 
Th i rd ly , labour is extremely poor ly remunerated in Lesotho. LNDC's 
recent survey, for instance, revealed that 60 percent of the workforce 
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was earning between R60 and R100 per month, whilst only 9 percent made 
more than R150123. There are severa l reasons fo r th is . In the f i r s t 
p lace , wages have h i s t o r i c a l l y been determined not by nego t i a t i on 
between employers and unions but by the Wages Advisory Board whose 
only function is to establish minimum rates for various occupations 
(although actual wages are supposed to be indexed to t r a in ing , 
experience and service) . Thus, in early 1984 the minimum monthly wage 
f o r l i g h t unski l l ed labour was only R61 wh i l s t that fo r a machine 
operator was R98. Moreover, whilst the Board apparently "takes into 
account increases in the cost of l i v ing " 1 2 4 and has recently observed 
1 
that in f la t ion has "seriously eroded the workers' purchasing power" 
there had in fact been no increase in the rates between Apri l 1981 and 
Apr i l 1984. And, as noted above, there i s cons iderab le r es i s tance 
amorq employers to recent proposals that recommend a radical revision 
of minimum wage po l i c y . So, wh i l e unions have made cons iderable 
advances recently in mobilising Basotho labour, they have yet to make 
a s i g n i f i c a n t impact upon employers. Secondly, the supply of labour 
far exceeds i t s demand and unions are acutely conscious that employers 
can very e a s i l y f ind replacements fo r r e c a l c i t r a n t workers. Some 
companies have even ins t i tu ted a day by day casual labour system to 
accommodate busy per iods without having to pay over t ime or s ign on 
workers at contracted rates. F i na l l y , compet i t ion wi th other 
peripheral investment s i tes in Southern Afr ica has tended to bid down 
the p r i c e of labour in Lesotho. Indeed, severa l o f our respondents 
remarked that Basotho labour was a l ready ' o ve r -p r i c ed ' r e l a t i v e to 
some of the bantustans. 
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In short , s ince Lesotho's a b i l i t y to a t t r a c t f o r e i gn investment 
depends heavily on the provision of incentives and the ava i l ab i l i t y of 
cheap labour, i t must continue to subsidise investment and suppress 
demands f o r wage increases. Moreover, the ' i n t e r n a l m u l t i p l i e r ' o f 
corporate investment i s further diminished by (a) the s ca r c i t y of 
l inkages between f o r e i gn companies and the domestic economy, (b) 
l eg is la t ion which permits foreign companies to repatriate p ro f i t s , and 
(c) the continuing tendency for Basotho consumer expenditure to 'leak' 
to South Afr ica. Furthermore, whilst the Lesotho government could act 
in a v a r i e t y of ways to enhance the impact of f o r e i gn investment on 
1 2fi 
the l o ca l economy , i t s freedom to do so is constrained by 
recogn i t i on of the f a c t that such act ions would adverse ly a f f e c t 
Lesotho's compet i t i veness as an investment s i te r e l a t i v e to 'growth 
points' in the bantustans. 
PROSPECTS 
Against these problems one should l i s t some p o s i t i v e aspects of the 
industrial development programme. For one thing, U®C has been able to 
secure f i nanc i a l support from a va r i e t y o f in te rnat iona l donors to 
help sustain i t s development e f f o r t s 1 2 7 . Secondly, the industrial and 
commercial base _is growing steadily and this should have some kind of 
'demonstration' e f f e c t upon potential investors. However, on balance, 
one must se r i ous l y quest ion the e f f i c a c y o f the programme. F i r s t l y , 
f o r e i gn investment i s having only a very s l i g h t e f f e c t on the"' 
unemployment f i gu r e s in Lesotho, present ly absorbing only 5 to 6 
percent of new entrants to the labour market per year. Secondly, 
Lesotho's ab i l i t y to attract foreign investment is l imited by several 
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factors most of which appear less problematic in at least two of i t s 
compet i tors , KwaZulu and Transkei. In pa r t i cu l a r , Lesotho cannot 
compete e f f e c t i v e l y with the incent i ve packages on o f f e r in the 
bantustans, while the labour situation is l i ke l y to become equally 
problematic in the future. Thirdly, the ' internal mult ip l ier ' that i s 
generated by f o r e i gn investment i s present ly of very l i m i t e d value 
with most of the benef i ts draining back to the metropolitan centres of 
South Africa. Moreover, whilst the Lesotho government could intervene 
to f o r c e up the value of the ' i n t e rna l m u l t i p l i e r ' i t i s we l l aware 
that any in t e r f e r ence in th i s d i r e c t i o n would fu r the r d iminish 
Lesotho's competitiveness as an investment s i te . 
A further problem could be Lesotho's rather cynical and opportunistic 
approach to the concessional trade advantages conferred by i t s western 
a l l i e s . The purpose of these concessions i s c l e a r l y not to a s s i s t 
South A f r i c a or South Afr ican-based companies. Ye t , in response to 
the dec l in ing compet i t i veness of i t s other incent i ves , the Lesotho 
government has come to p lace g rea ter emphasis on the " p o l i t i c a l l y 
dubious s t r a t e gy " of adver t i s ing i t s trade advantages to South 
A f r i can concerns. For wh i l s t t h i s i s obv ious ly an economical ly 
sensib le s t ra t egy g iven that the m a j o r i t y of f o r e i g n companies in 
Lesotho are South A f r i can , and whilst international donors might 
acknowledge that South African intervention in Lesotho's development 
d r i v e i s i n e v i t a b l e and perhaps b e n e f i c i a l in the short - term, i t i s 
quest ionable whether they would be prepared to continue o f f e r i n g 
concessions for the benef i t of South African capital . Moreover, there 
a / 
have been and w i l l be fur ther abuses of Lome whereby Lesotho 
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' c e r t i f i c a t e s o f o r i g i n ' a re approved on produc ts tha t a r e 
manufactured in South A f r i c a and then shipped to Lesotho (acquir ing 
'25 percent value-added' in the process) f o r onward transmission to 
markets overseas. F ina l l y , LNDC's po l i c y as regards South A f r i c an 
investment c l e a r l y cont rad ic ts the government's statements on the 
issue of d e p e n d e n c e 1 a n d this may further prejudice i t s relations 
with some donors and regional groupings such as SADOC and PTA. 
One could conclude, then, that Lesotho's industrial development policy 
i s i n e f f e c t u a l , misguided and p o l i t i c a l l y dangerous. Ye t , i t i s not 
immediately obvious what the alternatives might be. Certainly rural 
development e f f o r t s need to be continued and i n t e n s i f i e d but i t i s 
clear from the fa i lure of ear l ier programmes that Lesotho must face 
the f a c t that "the rural resource base simply does not have the 
capac i ty to support the rural population at current or acceptable 
consumption leve ls from agricultural ac t i v i t i e s alone"1-'1. Thus, the 
need to c r ea t e jobs outs ide ag r i cu l tu re cannot be denied. However, 
whilst the expansion of the modern sector under LNDC direct ion c lear ly 
makes an important contr ibut ion towards th i s o b j e c t i v e , the c o s t -
e f fect iveness of this kind of 'enclave' development is doubtful. I t is 
poss ib l e to argue, then, that more a t t ent ion should be d i r e c t ed 
towards the development of small businesses such as those established 
by BEDCO. Being locally-run, geared to local markets and suppliers and 
located in both urban and rural areas, these should have a far greater 
and more l as t ing impact upon the domestic economy1-'2. On the other 
hand, the a t t r a c t i on of f o r e i gn investment may be an eas ier and 
quicker way to c r ea t e jobs in the short-term and the government may 
the r e f o r e f ind th is to be the more p o l i t i c a l l y expedient s t ra tegy . 
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But i f , as argued here, Lesotho's a t t r ac t i v eness to investors is 
already declining and l ike ly to decline further re la t ive to i t s major 
c o m p e t i t o r s , i t i s impor tan t that the cha l l enge of dev is ing 
alternative strategies is confronted now rather than later. 
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